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Introduction
Smallholder farmers face a range of risks related to produc-
tion, transactions and human resources which often impact 
on their farming operations as well as their livelihoods. Farm 
output may vary from season to season because of the vagar-
ies of the weather, especially in countries where agriculture 
is predominantly rain-fed. Crop production can also be af-
fected by diseases, pests and other natural factors. They face 
human resource risks associated with death, disease and dis-
ability affecting the farmer and his/her family members. They 
may incur losses as a result of inability to enforce contracts 
and may themselves be vulnerable to legal risks arising from 
farm legislations or regulatory standards.  Smallholder farm-
ers are also exposed to uncertain access to markets and high 
price risks which may sometimes occur, or are accentuated 
by inefficiencies in markets or policy interventions. 
This brief provides an overview of different insurance tools 
that can be used by farmers to manage risks (see Table 1 for 
an overview of farm risks).   »
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2TABLE 1: TYPES OF RISKS THAT GENERALLY APPLY TO FARMING
Type of risk Micro risk affecting a 
farm household
Meso risk affecting com-
munities
Macro risk affection 
regions or nations
Market/prices Changes in price of land, 
new requirements from 
food industry
Changes in input/
output prices due to 
shocks, trade policy, new 
markets, endogenous 
variability
Production Flooding, non-contagious 
diseases, loss or deg-
radation of farm assets 
(land, livestock)
Rainfall, landslides, pol-
lution
Floods, droughts, pests, 
contagious diseases, 
technology
Financial Changes in income from 
other sources (non-farm) 
Changes in interest 
rates/values of financial 
assets/access to credit
Institutional/legal Liability of risk Changes in local policy or 
regulations
Changes in regional or 
national policy 
Personal Personal hazards, e.g. 
sickness, disability, in-
creased expenditures 
Smallholder farmers have limited access to formal risk management tools
The occurrence of a risk often generates a welfare loss to the farm household. This may be in the form 
of income or resource loss or reduced ability to earn income. The uncertainty about farm income result-
ing from exposure to farm risks tends to limit access to farm credit because of increased loan default 
risk. Lack of credit often translates into limited capacity of farmers to invest in yield-enhancing inputs, 
which will enable them raise output and productivity and therefore obtain higher household income. 
Furthermore, limited access to credit accentuates household liquidity constraints making them even 
more vulnerable to risk and compels most smallholder farmers to sell the bulk of their produce imme-
diately after harvest when prices are extremely low. 
Farmers in the industrialized countries are often able to use an array of instruments to isolate or cushion 
themselves against various shocks. They may benefit from public-funded programmes which seek to 
protect farmers from yield loss as well as variability in farmgate prices. They also have market-provided 
insurance products as well as cooperative insurance schemes which have proved to be quite success-
ful in pooling risks. In Europe, Spain has a crop insurance scheme that is backed by government while 
France has a calamity fund to deal with disasters. The US has a range of private crop insurance schemes 
including the Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) which covers yield shortfall, and the Crop Revenue 
Coverage which protects against yield and price. They also have the Catastrophic Risk Protection (for 
which premiums are often subsidised by the Federal Government). Australia has no crop insurance but 
uses special flexibility in the banking system and the social security schemes to help farmers deal with 
shocks. In Canada, farmers’ organisations have played important roles in developing supply manage-
ment schemes and various income insurance programmes. In the specific case of flood risk the following 
compensation mechanisms are common in OECD countries: disaster relief, subsidised crop insurance, 
interest subsidies for loans, or compensation schemes for flood-water retention on farmland1.
1. Morris, J., T. Hess and H. Posthumus. (2010) Agriculture’s role in flood adaptation and mitigation – policy issues and approaches. Cranfield 
University. OECD. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/786804541573
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3Farmers in developing countries are generally more vulnerable to farming risks than their counterparts 
in the industrialized countries largely because production is predominantly rain-fed and involves limited 
use of technologies to control the forces of nature. On top of that, they are severely disadvantaged in 
terms of access to formal risk management instruments. Most public support programmes are either 
unavailable, cannot be accessed by smallholders, or have been abolished or scaled down after liberali-
sation of agricultural sectors and market-based instruments which allow producers to transfer risk to 
better capitalised entities. Therefore, informal ways of reducing and coping with risk have been devel-
oped by farmers and rural communities over generations. The informal systems they adopt include the 
following:
•	Risk minimisation strategies such as enterprise diversification (e.g. mixed cropping); share cropping 
(to share risk with landowner); cultivation of drought-tolerant but low-yielding varieties and re-
allocation of labour between farm and non-farm rural employment.
•	Coping strategies which include maintaining reserves of non-interest-earning assets which are 
sold in the event of a shock (e.g. livestock and jewellery); reducing household consumption and/or 
investment in, for example, education of children (especially girls). 
These strategies often provide only limited protection to the farm household, hamper adoption of 
yield-enhancing technology and/or leave the household even more exposed to severe negative shocks2. 
We discuss below some of the market-based risk management tools which can potentially be used to 
mitigate farm risks.
Conventional crop insurance mechanisms
Conventional crop insurance products are delivered by insurance companies, which take relatively small 
payments (premiums) from farmers (the policy holders) and guarantee that when a stated eventuality 
occurs they will compensate (indemnity) the insured for a financial loss incurred. The insurance policy 
usually sets out the terms, conditions and circumstances under which the insured will be financially 
compensated. The policies may cover single or multiple perils and compensation may be determined on 
the basis of yield or revenue loss depending on the type of insurance product. The insurance products 
can protect the livelihoods and assets of farmers from catastrophic losses. They can at the same time 
promote output and income growth at household level by improving access to farm credit and improved 
farm technology as risks are transferred to credible third parties (the insurance companies). 
Most conventional insurance involves reinsurance. It is an insurance that is purchased by an insurance 
company (insurer) from another insurance company (reinsurer) as a means of transferring all or part of 
the risk to the reinsurer, who is paid a reinsurance premium. It is important for insurance companies that 
cover correlated risks and thus run the risk of having to cover big losses. Without reinsurance, premi-
ums would have to be set at very high levels to build up enough reserves so that potentially high losses 
can be covered. In reinsurance schemes, the insurer and re-insurer can share premiums and risk by 
establishing a quota that determines how premiums and losses are distributed between direct insurer 
and reinsurer. 
Innovative crop insurance mechanisms
In most developing countries, access to conventional crop insurance by smallholders is extremely low.  
A major supply-side factor is the fact that farm risks tend to be highly covariant (affect a large number 
2. Dercon, S. (2002). Growth and shocks: evidence from rural Ethiopia. Journal of Development Economics 74(2): 309-329
 Siegel (2005). Looking at rural risk management using an asset-based approach. Commodity Risk Management Group, Agricultural and Rural 
Development Department, ESW, The World Bank, Washington, DC.  
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of people at the same time, e.g. flood, drought and earthquakes) rather than idiosyncratic (affect indi-
viduals or a few people). Hence, pay-outs when the insured event occurs can be very high, which is why 
the insurance company has to charge very high premiums to sustain delivery. High levels of fraud and 
moral hazard problems (where the insured party is less diligent than normal because of the guarantee 
of payment if, for instance, in the event of a yield loss) are associated with this form of insurance. To 
mitigate this, insurance companies may be required to institute intensive monitoring systems, increas-
ing the cost of delivery. Furthermore, demand tends to be rather high from those who are most at risk, 
also known as the adverse selection problem. On the demand-side, smallholders may find premiums 
unaffordable. They may also consider investing in an instrument from which there is no return in nor-
mal years unattractive, unless it is linked with improved access to credit and improved farm technology. 
Recent innovations in the insurance market have involved efforts to address some of these problems in 
order to ensure sustainable delivery of insurance to the poor, including smallholder farmers.
Index-based insurance
A different category of insurances are index based. These make payments based not on measures of 
farm yields or revenues, but rather on indexes, measured by government agencies or other third par-
ties. When the index falls below (e.g. in the case of drought) or above (e.g. in the case of flood) a certain 
threshold, insured farmers automatically receive a payment, eliminating the need to estimate their 
potential yield losses. These cost reductions make it possible to offer insurance to smallholder farmers. 
Unlike most insurances that require risks to be unlinked or independent, index insurances work best for 
the individual farmer when risks are linked. There are different types:
•	Area Yield Index insurance: payments are calculated from the decrease in the average yield in a 
certain area, which is some unit of geographical aggregation larger than the farm.
•	Area Revenue Index insurance: payments are calculated from the decrease in the combination of (i) 
the average yields and (ii) prices in a certain area.
•	Weather Index Insurance: indices of yields or vegetation computed from weather-based indices, 
satellite images and others. When, for instance, actual rainfall falls below this index, payments are 
made.
Index-based insurance products appear to have the best prospects for outreach to smallholder farm-
ers on a sustainable basis. Indexation avoids some of the moral hazard and fraud problems that require 
very costly monitoring systems that make insurance unaffordable. There have even been schemes 
under which farmers who adopt farm husbandry practices that reduce losses when a trigger event oc-
curs are rewarded. By broadening geographic coverage of the scheme, adverse selection problems can 
also be reduced. There have been, therefore, several (donor-funded) pilot projects but success cases 
remain limited. A number of recent reviews attribute this to factors such as the lack of (historical) data 
on the basis of which premiums can be computed accurately; lack of basic infrastructure (e.g. weather 
stations); contract design issues (e.g. it is argued that if the weather rather than the crop is insured then 
the product can be sold to other parties who are not farmers); limited uptake by banks and microfinance 
institutions which can link the insurance to credit, thereby making it more attractive to farmers; diffi-
culty in attracting international reinsurance companies (some of which do not consider these as proper 
insurance products); and linkage to other insurance schemes (e.g. Calamity Funds), which cover losses 
when the scale of catastrophic events make private insurance uneconomic. 
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When the scale of losses from calamities or natural catastrophes makes provision of market-based 
insurance difficult, governments often step in with aid. The relief for affected people may be provided 
from Calamity Funds which have the advantage of avoiding major distortion of government budgets. 
Well-known examples include the Philippines National Calamity Fund (NCF) and Local Calamity Fund 
(LCF). These funds are made available exclusively for disaster-related activities such as relief, rehabili-
tation, reconstruction, and other works or services in connection with calamities and can complement 
private insurance. It is possible for the private sector to contribute to the funds in the form of levies on 
output to insurance premiums. 
 
Micro-insurance
The market for agricultural micro-insurance typically consists of low-income farmers in developing 
countries, with limited or no previous exposure to insurance. As is the case with conventional insurance, 
which involves pooling risks, micro-insurance does the same, but links multiple small units into larger 
structures that can pool risks and as such creates structures for governance. The novelty lies in the 
organized approach involving multiple levels. It may cover a wide variety of risks including health risks 
(illness, injury, or death) and property risks (damage or loss). Some of the micro-insurance products 
offered include funeral insurance, life insurance and disability insurance. This mechanism may be less 
suitable for covariant risks such as risks related to extreme weather (e.g. flooding, drought) or other 
natural hazards.
Micro-cooperative approach
Similarly, one can imagine that a micro-price pooling approach can to a certain extent mitigate the 
negative effects of crop price variability for African farmers within even a small community. This might 
be labelled a micro-cooperative approach. Pooling spot prices among farmers in a situation where sales 
can be spread over a longer harvesting time, may reduce price risks to all members of the pool. The ef-
ficacy will increase if storage facilities are available.
Emerging conclusions
It is apparent that pervasive production and post-harvest risks constitute a major obstacle in efforts to 
increase productivity, raise household income and reduce poverty among smallholder farmers. Small-
holder farmers tend to rely on informal risk minimisation and coping strategies that are sub-optimal 
because of lack of access to formal insurance instruments. Innovative insurance products with features 
that reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems as well as fraud while also reducing monitor-
ing and administrative costs have the potential to increase access to insurance for smallholders. Uptake 
of such products, which include index-based insurance products, has been slow but can potentially 
increase if they are linked with improved access to credit. Furthermore, the private market may not be 
sufficiently capitalised to bear the cost of major calamities and as such setting up well-funded Calamity 
Funds to complement private insurance will be worthwhile. It is also apparent, as illustrated in Table 2 
below, that some of the risks facing smallholder farmers cannot be mitigated using insurance products, 
in particular risks related to markets and the institutional environment. They have to deploy other risk 
mitigating instruments beyond the scope of this brief.
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Type of risk Micro risk affecting a 
farm household
Meso risk affecting com-
munities
Macro risk affection 
regions or nations
Market/prices Contract farming Micro-cooperative approach 
Forward contracts
OTC Put options and 
exchange-traded options
Forward contracts
and exchange-traded 
options
Production Index-based insurance
Traditional crop insur-
ance
Index-based insurance 
complemented by Calamity 
funds
Calamity funds comple-
mented by
Index-based insurance
Financial Financial savings and 
access to consumption 
smoothing credit
Financial savings and 
access to consumption 
smoothing credit
Welfare support systems
Financial savings and 
access to consumption 
smoothing credit
Institutional/legal - - -
Personal Micro-insurance Micro-insurance Micro-insurance
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